1. Introduction

Writing within a Saussurean theoretical context, Roland Barthes had this to say of the advertising image:

Why [study the advertising image]? Because in advertising the signification of the image is undoubtedly intentional; the signifieds of the advertising message are formed a priori by certain attributes of the product and the signifieds need to be transmitted as clearly as possible.(1977, p. 33)

Leaving aside any issues with the Saussurean terminology employed here, Barthes’ point is that advertising images somehow display their purpose. The present paper, then, examines the way Peircean semiotics accommodates the sort of intention and purpose to be found not in advertising images, but in classes of signs with an equally intentional nature, namely pictorial signs presenting the ideologically destructive purpose of iconoclasm. Unlike the Course in General Linguistics (Saussure, [1916] 1972), which, although drawing from course notes taken over a period of six years and involving important revisions in the final course, presents a relatively homogeneous set of concepts that came to found European semiology, Peirce’s theory of semiotics, which he considered as a form of logic, evolved over a period of nearly 50 years. Consequently, there is no similarly homogeneous set of concepts for Peirce scholars to draw upon. In what follows, then, the paper attempts to bring out the major theoretical differences between two of Peirce’s later versions of this logic, and to show that the second is in an important way more appropriate for the analysis of the very deliberate, intentional nature of iconoclasm offered in the illustrations. The two versions in question are the ten-class triadic system conceived by Peirce for the Lowell Lectures on Logic of 1903, and the 28-class hexadic system described in the letter to Lady Welby dated 23 December 1908 (EP2, pp. 478-481).

The paper is organized as follows. First, the well-known 1903 three-division tenclass typology is reviewed and illustrated in order both to bring out its salient features and to show how it fails to account for intentionality. Second, the paper sets out the basic features of the six-division, 28-class system, showing how it differs from the earlier.Finally, two cases of transmodal iconoclasm and the ideology they draw on, namely Guy Debord’s radical subversion of the principles of the cinema and the iconoclasm informing a photomontage by Barbara Kruger, are presented in order to explore the semiotic potential of the hexadic typology for the analysis of “intentional” image-based signs.

2. The Logic of 1903

2.1 The ten-class system

To begin with, a brief reminder of the logic as Peirce developed it during what can be seen as the first of two high points in his logical investigations, namely the course of lectures he gave on logic at the Lowell Institute in November 1903. He had planned a comprehensive Syllabus to accompany these courses, but the published version ran only to 23 pages, and was devoted to the classification of the sciences, the ethics of terminology and an introduction to his Existential Graphs, while the “leading conceptions of logic” planned for the Syllabus were completely omitted. However,much of the material from the manuscripts yielding valuable semiotic information has been reproduced in the Collected Papers, and, more conveniently, in the two successive chapters of volume two of The Essential Peirce, namely chapters 20 and 21 of Peirce(1998). Here we see the importance of his phenomenology and its three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness for the analysis of the concept of sign at this time: in the first of the two chapters, Peirce employs his phenomenology to formulate a definition of the sign together with two divisions based on the sign and its relations with its two correlates. These are, respectively, the divisions S—O and S—I: the sign in its relation to its object, yielding the well-known icon-index-symbol trichotomy, and the sign in its relation to its interpretant, in which the rheme-dicent-argument subdivisions which had initially composed the symbol now acquired independent status (EP2, pp.272-275). In the second chapter, containing much of the later manuscript, R540, he redefines the sign in terms of its logical status within a triadic relation, and establishes a third division involving the sign itself, no doubt realizing that it would be illogical to proclaim the phenomenological status of the S—O and S—I divisions without having first established that of the sign (EP2, pp. 290-292). The subdivisions within each division were established by application of his three categories (Table 1), and the scheme generated ten distinct classes of signs.

在全球贸易形势不断发生变化的情况下，中国企业参与国际市场也在逐步多元化。特别是在“一带一路”的倡议下，中国企业主动出击，积极“走出去”开拓国际市场。

Examining first Table 1, we note that the correlates S, O, I, defined in 1903 as the constituents of a triadic relation, supply the “respects”, as Peirce was later to call the facets or features of semiosis contributing to the classification of the sign (EP2, 1908,pp. 482), by means of which he obtained ten classes of signs. The three divisions themselves are realized as the sign, S, plus the two relational trichotomies mentioned earlier, namely S—O and S—I, respectively the sign’s mode of representation and its informative capacity. We note that the mode of representation doesn’t actually identify the sign’s object, it simply constitutes the three phenomenologically distinct ways in which an object can be represented by the sign.Peirce doesn’t explain how the ten classes are to be obtained, stating simply: “The affinities of the ten classes are exhibited by arranging their designations in [a] triangular table” (CP 2.264, 1903), but this scheme from his Logic Notebook R339 (Figure 1) shows the compatibilities between the various subdivisions, where the straight and oblique lines (reading from right to left) indicate permissible pairs of paths between subdivisions establishing the ten sign classes. For example, the straight line to Icon from Qualisign and the two oblique lines from Sinsign and Legisign to Icon respectively identify the classes of Qualisigns, Iconic sinsigns and Iconic legisigns. Finally, it is important to note that the criteria enabling Peirce to differentiate the structure of each of the three trichotomies are the three phenomenological categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness: this was to change.

Table 1. The ten-class typology of 1903

Figure 1. Extract from R339, 239v

2.2 A warning sign

Consider as an illustration of the way this particular system functions an EDF warning sign-board placed on a fence surrounding an Electricity transformer in Central London(Figure 2), presumably for EDF employees and members of the public alike. As with all signs and sign-boards of this category in Britain, it is very clearly “intentional” in Barthes’ sense, and this one is composed of an apex-up, triangular form with black edging against a yellow background (in the original), yellow being the “be careful”safety color in such cases. The various possible pictograms to be found within the triangle are also in black. Where the warning pertains simply to the presence of electricity the pictogram is a stylized lightning flash. The more complex pictogram on Figure 2 signifies additionally that there is danger of death. As is the case here, there is also the possible addition of a text message in such signs to make the import of the warning absolutely clear.

Figure 2. A warning sign-board

How would the system of 1903 accommodate the information thus presented on the sign-board? It is obviously a legisign: the stylized composition of the prostrate human beneath the lightning flash forms a compound pictogram. Although iconic in form—since we recognize the two objects depicted—they can only be signs of “possible” objects;additionally, we see that they function within a complex legisign system. The verbal sign is formed of an expression associating two common nouns without determiners and therefore function here as proper nouns. In this way, the expression constitutes a compound indexical legisign. Now, all these various components are rhematic. That is,they don’t “tell” us anything: they can’t, since they don’t represent existent entities. The whole signboard posted on the very existential surrounding fence at this particular site,on the other hand, functions as a replica of a dicent indexical legisign signifying that“The meaning of this sign applies here!” Finally, such a blend of pictorial and verbal legisigns obviously categorizes this type of intentional sign as multimodal, although within the 1903 semiotic system it is logically incapable of declaring its intentionality.The ten classes of signs of 1903 were obtained through the phenomenological analysis of the types of possible relations holding between sign and object and sign and interpretant,consequently their origin—the object—or the effect they may have on those who interpret them—the interpretant—are irrelevant and cannot enter the analysis. With this in mind we turn to the very different sign-system of 1908 and, after that, from the intention to warn that we as observers fully understand independently of the sign on Figure 2 to a very different type of intentional signifying practice, iconoclasm.

3. The System of 1908

The evolution from the system of 1903 to that of 1908 is not easily documented, being characterized by many changes of viewpoint and approaches to the problem of the sign,and can only be dealt with summarily in this paper. The interested reader is referred to Jappy (2016a, Chapters 2 and 3), and also to Jappy (2016b) in which the information below is presented and illustrated in a slightly different manner. This evolution is presented in what follows in four main stages, these being dealt with on a year-by-year basis for convenience, and these stages take us to the point where intentionality can effectively be shown to function within Peirce’s concept of semiosis. The evolution begins in the year that follows the Lowell Lectures, 1904.

3.1 1904 six correlates

Table 2 sets out in tabular form Peirce’s description of a new, more complex typology described in the letter to Lady Welby of 12 October 1904 (CP 8.327-8.341). The correlates associated with the sign have been expanded from two to five elements instead of the earlier three: the process of sign-action, therefore, now involves six subjects,namely the sign, the immediate object, the dynamic object and the interpretants,standardized for convenience as immediate, dynamic and final. This more comprehensive typology has as its respects the sign plus a set of five divisions, all relational as in 1903,but Peirce never developed it in the way he had exploited and illustrated the earlier tenclass system. It is important to note, too, that the criteria enabling the analyst to establish these relational divisions in the typology are the three phenomenological categories, as in 1903.

完成了未来5～10年黄委实行最严格水资源保护制度顶层设计——《贯彻落实中央水利工作会议精神 全面推进黄河流域水资源保护工作实施意见》。

Table 2. The hexad of 12 October 1904

3.2 1905-1906 sign as medium

This was a period of intense thinking about logic on Peirce’s part, for he produced six different typologies in his Logic Notebook (R339) between October 10, 1905 and August 31, 1906. This, too, was the period in which he began to see the sign as a medium. In the course of the Lowell Lectures of 1903, Peirce had defined the sign in the following manner, in which we see the influence of his conception of triadic relations:

A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second,called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP 2.274)

However, in the period 1905-1906, no doubt partly as a consequence of the expanded set of correlates, he considerably modified the role of the sign in semiosis, and, by virtue of integrating two objects and three interpretants in his conception of sign-action, explicitly attributed to the sign itself a more constrained mediating role, as we see in the following extract from RL463, a draft letter to Lady Welby dated 9 March 1906:

I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant [. . .] In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only as a consequence of the communication. (EP2, p. 477)

This was not an isolated case of Peirce defining the sign as a medium: “All my notions are too narrow. Instead of ‘Sign’ ought I not to say Medium?” (R339 293r, 1906). This also was a prominent feature of Peirce’s thinking on pragmatism, particularly in 1906. From this it follows that by defining the sign as a medium Peirce was beginning to attribute a far more explicit role, too, to the object in semiosis. The determining influence of the object now explicitly involves the communication of “form” via the immediate object to the sign,which then communicates this form to the series of interpretants, the form in question being none other than the realization of one or other or all of Peirce’s categories of the forms of experience, namely the monad, dyad and triad (CP 1.452, 1896), and this independently of the utterer and the interpreter as participants in the semiosis. Such a position, of course,raises the questions of what sort of entity the dynamic object is and what its semiotic scope may be. Consider the following extract from manuscript R793, in which Peirce avoids human psychology in the logical nature of sign-action by identifying utterer and interpreter as quasi-minds, abstract theoretical constructs which suggest that the logic as conceived by Peirce at this time cannot yet accommodate purpose or intentionality.

For the purposes of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality of all our feeling should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three, quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated. (R793, 1906, pp. 1-2)

3.3 1907 semiosis defined

In the manuscript “Pragmatism” of 1907, Peirce, no doubt aware of the immensity of the task before him, defines “semiotic” in a novel manner, and announces the need for future research into the identification in logic of what he saw as all possible varieties of semiosis:I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer.(R318, 1907, p. 119)

In other words, since the time of the Greeks, Western metaphysics has been dominated by visual perception, a metaphysics characterized as ocularcentrist or even as heliocentrist(e.g. Plato’s Cavern and the ascent towards the sun and, metaphorically, towards knowledge and truth). But at the same time, it is a conception of the world whose perverse effects have stimulated a succession of mainly French intellectuals or Frenchspeaking intellectuals (see, for example, Jay, 1994) who in the course of the 20th century have criticized abuses ascribed to vision which have developed since the Greeks (see Illich, 2001 for a brief overview): abuse of the power of the gaze in the case of Sartre or Foucault, for example, and in the case of Debord, the dumbing seduction of an excess of images the insidious purpose of which being, he claimed, to hide the real world from us.And almost as a direct consequence, since the Cours de linguistique générale in particular and the structuralist program it brought about, there has been an anti-ocularist movement,a so-called “linguistic turn” and with it the metaphor of language as an alternative to visual perception in the way we conceive our world and explain our social relations. It is a parallel movement of thought which is condensed and illustrated in such a striking manner in Debord’s film—he was no structuralist—, and it is this very same movement of thought, transported no doubt in the late Sixties onto American soil and disseminated in the universities and artistic milieux, which has contributed to the iconoclasm of Barbara Kruger.

It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between two subjects [whether they react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially] or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by “semiosis” I mean, on the contrary,an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign,its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. (CP 5.484, 1907)

3.4 1908 hexadic semiosis

Finally, in a letter to Lady Welby of 23 December 1908 he expanded this triadic“cooperation” into a one involving six subjects in the following description of the dynamism in semiosis, which also appears to be the only mention of the 28-class, sixdivision typology in the Peirce canon:

计算表明，边坡上的潜在危险滑面主要分布在居民区305省道的公路路基部位，且其潜在危险滑面在暴雨工况下安全系数较低，公路路基挡墙部位不满足建筑边坡工程Ⅱ级边坡最小抗滑稳定安全系数，与挡墙部位出现拉裂外倾、路面塌陷及前缘坡脚开裂情况相符，说明边坡前缘居民区内局部土质边坡处于临界稳定或欠稳定状态。

It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible, it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object,

which determines the Sign itself,

which determines the Destinate Interpretant,

which determines the Effective Interpretant,

Consequently, by collaging deictics over a photograph of a photograph, as in the case of Figure 7, the hegemonic potency of the visual image is weakened by two degrees. In the sign-system of 1903, the image without text would be classified as a dicent (indexical) sinsign: photographs are indexical by virtue of their being existentially determined through actual spatio-temporal contact with their object, the model: no model,no photograph. Such is Kruger’s iconoclasm, however, that the immediacy and deictic strength of the original photograph has been as though emasculated: first, by being the object of a second photographic process and, second, by being overlaid with verbal signs,signs from an entirely different but more dominant representational mode. Within the typology of 1903 a photograph is a variety of index. By photographing a photograph Kruger has destroyed the existential relation holding between the original model—a milliner’s hat stand!—and, furthermore, by overlaying the photograph with this very powerful slogan, she has demoted, so to speak, what was originally indexical to an iconic sinsign. Like Debord’s film of his book, Kruger’s verbal assault on the visual source of the photographic medium is transmodal, too. It now remains to see how we can account for this deliberate, i.e. intentional, ideologically inspired transgressive and destructive impulse, and to do this we return to a highly original feature of Peirce’s hexadic typology briefly referred to in Section 3 above, namely the three universes of existence which enabled him to identify the subdivisions in the later typology.

the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were independent, only yield twenty-eight classes; and if, as I strongly opine (not to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies of signs of the same order of importance, instead of making 59049 classes, these will only come to sixty-six. (EP2, p. 481)

临近年底，备受关注的《个人所得税专项附加扣除暂行办法》（以下简称《暂行办法》）终于正式亮相，标志着我国综合与分类相结合的个税改革迈出关键一步，释放出更加惠民的积极信号。

Here we have Peirce discarding the phenomenological framework mentioned in his intended Syllabus for the Lowell Lectures and adopting instead what is broadly referred to here as an ontological one. The three-division ten-class typology displayed on Table 1 used Peirce’s three categories as the criteria in order to subdivide the sign and two sign-correlate trichotomies. The later hexadic typology introduced in the 1908 letter,on the other hand, is now defined within a framework which employs three universes of existence to establish the subdivisions of the six correlates of semiosis, specifically,a universe of possibles, one of existents and one of necessitants, in order of increasing complexity (EP2, pp. 478-479). These, when properly combined with the subjects of the typology, namely the six correlates of semiosis, generate twenty-eight very different classes of signs. The determination process itself can be represented more simply by the scheme on Figure 3, in which the interpretants have been standardized respectively from destinate, effective and explicit to immediate, dynamic and final. Note that some authors,e.g. Savan (1988, p. 52), inverse this order, identifying the explicit as the immediate, and the destinate as the final. In view of the order established in the determination sequence in the quotation above, this would produce the illogical situation where the final interpretant determines its own immediate interpretability, a case of putting the logical cart before the logical horse. Figure 3 displays in simple form the hexadic structure of semiosis as Peirce conceived it in 1908, in which the arrow ‘→’ indicates the process of determination of the successive “subjects” in the process, and in which the abbreviations Od, Oi, S, Ii, Id and If represent, respectively, the dynamic and immediate objects, the sign, followed by the immediate, dynamic and final interpretants:

Figure 3. Hexadic semiosis in 1908

3.5 The 28-class, hexadic typology of 1908

Table 3 sets out the six divisions occupying the initial positions in the ten described by Peirce in the letter to Lady Welby. It is formatted vertically as Peirce might have done if he had isolated and described this particular typology—which he never did, what follows being therefore necessarily speculative. This classification system employs the same six correlates as on Table 2, but by 1908 Peirce’s conception of the classification of signs can be seen in Tables 3 and 4 to have matured considerably in two important ways. First,it is the correlates themselves as they occur in semiosis which constitute the respects of the typology, as opposed to the sign and its two and five relational divisions employed respectively in Tables 1 and 2. Second, the criteria employed to establish the subdivisions are no longer the three categories, for these have been replaced by the three logical universes mentioned above and discussed in detail in section 4.3.

Table 3. The hexad of 23 December 1908 with the subjects set out down the page

Concluding this summary of the development of the later semiotics, we see that by defining these universes of existence and the sorts of entities they can contain, including signs, objects and interpretants, Peirce had changed significantly the theoretical framework within which he approached the problem of the classification of signs.Moreover, since the object is now defined to be the origin or initiator of semiosis, it is clearly the object which has to be the locus of intentionality. Thus, while the system of 1903, in which the identity of the object is irrelevant, is unable to accommodate intentionality, that of 1908 can show it to be a source of semiosis. We know that it was the intention of the electricity company EDF to post the warning sign-board shown on Figure 1 outside the transformer in order to prevent accidents. This intentionality is the sign-board’s dynamic object, while its immediate object informs the actual arrangement of elements on the board, namely those drawn from the official repertory of signs,pictograms and wordings which constitute what the company thought to be appropriate signifying elements. With this in mind, we turn to the problem of transmodal iconoclasm,a signifying impulse that is of considerable interest to semiotic analysis in view of the fact that the hexad of 1908 has no icon-index-symbol division.

4. Iconoclasm

(aɪˈkɒnəklæz(ə)m)

iconoclasm

Although not the only source, the Oxford English Dictionary offers the following convenient definition of iconoclasm:

去片后的裸眼视力频数分布如图1所示。71%（37/52）的儿童去片后裸眼视力集中在0.6～0.8。通过单因素回归分析，较差的去片裸眼视力与基础较长的眼轴（b=-0.09，β=-0.29，P=0.003）、较高的球镜度（b=0.07，β=0.36，P＜0.001）、较高的柱镜度（b=0.12，β=0.22，P=0.030）有关，与角膜厚度、眼压、角膜曲率、瞳孔直径、角膜对称性、偏位程度等无关（见表2）。

[f. Gr. to break: after next.]

We examine, to begin with, the simple example of the image on Figure 4. This shows the heads of the relief figures in a cathedral which were defaced during the unrest that developed in the Netherlands at the time of the Reformation in the late 16th century,as a consequence of which the originally Catholic cathedral became Protestant. The iconoclasm depicted here is a typical example of the willful destruction of idolatrous images judged to have been venerated in place of the deity, the nose and the eyes in particular of such images and statues being prime targets for such defacement.

Figure 4. An example of religious iconoclasm. Damaged relief statues in the Cathedral of Saint Martin, Utrecht. By Arktos - Own work, CC BY-SA 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1125776

The breaking or destroying of images; esp. the destruction of images and pictures set up as objects of veneration (see iconoclast 1); transf. and fig. the attacking or overthrow of venerated institutions and cherished beliefs, regarded as fallacious or superstitious.Iconoclasm is thus a transgressive representational impulse driven by the intention to subvert or destroy illustrations of received or hegemonic ideological values. Since iconoclasm is the deliberate destruction or damaging of pictorial signs, amongst other things, the problem for Peircean semiotics, then, is to account for such signs and such intention.

从“远远落后于时代”到“日益走近世界舞台中央”，新时代改革开放的全球坐标在变化。中国与世界深度交融发展，世界从未如此聚焦中国。今天的改革，必须在百年未有的国际大变局中，经受各种风浪的洗礼。

Consider, now, two cases of iconoclasm which correspond more closely to the second part of the definition given above—what we might call “ideological” iconoclasm, as exemplified in the anti-cinema of Guy Debord and the photomontages of Barbara Kruger.An important feature of these forms of iconoclasm is their characteristic transmodality,a further theoretical challenge for a typology that has no icon-index-symbol division to account for changes or conflicts in modality. Note that the analyses developed below are not intended to be an informed critique of the works of the two artists as art, but simply necessary background information for the general reader as to the ideological stimulus of the iconoclastic impulse that the works of the two creative artists exhibit.

4.1 Guy Debord: The society of the spectacle

Guy Debord’s iconoclasm was rooted in his encounter with the Romanian artist Isidore Isou at the Cannes Film Festival in 1951, where the latter had presented his film Traité de bave et d’éternité, the English title being Venom and Eternity. The film was composed of onomatopoetic Lettrist poetry and ill-assorted monologues as its sound-track and the visual element was a series of unconnected, disparate images. The idea of completely dissociating sound-track and imagery was probably the inspiration for Debord’s first anti-cinema film Hurlements en faveur de Sade (Screaming in favor of de Sade) in 1952.The iconoclasm in this hour-long cinematic creation consisted in projecting passages of blank white screen during which various voices read disconnected passages from the French administrative Civil Code or fragments of unconnected literary texts, these passages being interspersed with almost 40 minutes of passages during which the screen remained completely black without a sound-track of any sort. The whole creation formed a comprehensive antithesis of what an audience would expect at the cinema. Debord subsequently became a member of Isou’s Lettrist movement, where he discovered and adopted Isou’s use of détournement or “appropriation”. Debord ultimately broke with Isou and co-founded the Situationist International movement in Italy in 1957 (and disbanded it in 1972, faute de combattants—there was nobody left in the movement!).

话说前几年，上夜班，其他人喊我去处理一个疑难杂症。原来是一位高中女生，一晚上换了三家医院，三家医院都说处理不了，后来到了我们医院。所有的检查都指向这女生是宫外孕，需要手术，可女生坚决否认有过性生活，家长在身边怎么劝也不说。

Appropriation was an important ideological strategy developed and used to great effect by the Situationists, Debord above all. The concept refers to the decision to divert other people’s texts and images from their original use and context: it was, in short, a form of fully intentional plagiarism, “highjacking” or simply borrowing wherever one wished someone else’s creations, for the Situationists dismissed as bourgeois nonsense the notions of inspiration and originality in art, claiming that the elements of artistic creation are already there at one’s disposal, ready to be employed by anybody who wishes to take them.

Whatever one may think of such an attitude half a century later, this was not schoolboy antics but a serious ideological position which culminated in the publication by Debord of the Société du spectacle (Debord, 1967, 1994). Not only is the text scattered with borrowings from Marx, Hegel, Lukács and others diverted (détournés) from their original use and context, but it also reads like a cross between a Marxist political manifesto and a critique of the alienating effects of contemporary vision-based consumer culture, composed, à la Luther, of some 221 “theses”, or critical statements. It is not the purpose of this paper to introduce and justify the rationale behind Debord’s very eloquent anti-ocularist critique of contemporary society, but the following extracts should provide the reader with an idea of the scope of the iconoclasm it was to generate in a film six years later. The very first thesis, which echoes Marx’s opening statement in Capital—‘The wealth of those societies, in which the capitalist mode of production reigns, presents itself as an “immense accumulation of commodities”’—establishes the basis of Debord’s assault on vision and light, the hegemonic status of sight amongst the senses, imagery and the cinema in particular as a vector of this hegemony, with his claim that real life has been replaced by an accumulation of “spectacles”, or alienating social relations established by images, of which the principal vector was the cinema:

In societies dominated by modern conditions of production, life is presented as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has receded into a representation. Thesis 1 (Trans., Knabb)

The spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people that is mediated by images. Thesis 4 (Trans., Knabb)

When the real world is transformed into mere images, mere images become real beings—dynamic figments that provide the direct motivations for a hypnotic behavior. Since the spectacle’s job is to use various specialized mediations in order to show us a world that can no longer be directly grasped, it naturally elevates the sense of sight to the special preeminence once occupied by touch: the most abstract and easily deceived sense is the most readily adaptable to the generalized abstraction of present-day society… Thesis 18 (Trans., Knabb,emphasis added)

Now this subversive intention is even more transgressive in the film of the same name that Debord produced from his text in 1973. This was an aggressive and genially iconoclastic enterprise, for on the cinematic level Debord deliberately inverted the roles traditionally accorded in cinema to word and image. Whereas in Hollywood films, for example, as far as the audience is concerned, the progression of the film is carried by the sequence of images with the soundtrack fulfilling the functions of anchorage and relay in the form of dialogues or voice-overs, in Debord’s film it is the extracts from his text which ensure this progression, extracts which he reads for an hour and a half in a solemn,sober and monochord voice, relegating the images to a completely subordinate role. These are composed of clips of striptease, extracts from filmed reports of political meetings and their tenors, extracts from famous Hollywood westerns, images of white American policemen beating up young Blacks, etc.; in short, images drawn from the frivolous,treacherous, deceitful and sometimes very violent world that the text is denouncing.The visual part, these floating sequences of images, decontextualized and reduced to the simple illustration of the uninterrupted flow of the text, is in black and white, of a very variable quality, a deliberate artistic decision which produces an astonishing spectral effect (Figures 5 and 6).

在其2013年3月发表的“美国小学数学结构之批评”一文中，马立平博士用下图比较了传统数学(左)和发现式数学(右)在内容和结构上的差异[7]：

Figure 5. Screenshot from La Société du spectacle, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGN5N3vrbLE

Figure 6. The same with Italian subtitles, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eE_nu1n7-jI

Figure 5 shows a screenshot from the film, a platform seen through control panels as a train draws into a station, while Figure 6 shows the same sequence but displays the Italian subtitles appearing as Debord declaims his text. The iconoclasm evident here is not transmedial, of course, as the platform or medium—film—remains constant, and would be classified within the 1903 typology as a variety of index, a member of the class of dicent (indexical) sinsigns. On the other hand, the role and mode inversion that promotes the spoken word over the moving image is a clear case of transmodal image-breaking.

Why should Debord have adopted this deliberate anti-aesthetic? The following short extract from the first section of The Society of the Spectacle should enable the reader to understand Debord’s position:

The spectacle inherits the weakness of the Western philosophical project, which attempted to understand activity by means of the categories of vision, and it is based on the relentless development of the particular technical rationality that grew out of that form of thought. The spectacle does not realize philosophy, it philosophizes reality, reducing everyone’s concrete life to a universe of speculation. Thesis 19 (Trans., Knabb)

The next stage in the development of Peirce’s conception of sign-action, then, comes in 1907, with the definition of semiosis. For Peirce now saw the nature of the association of what he must still have considered to be the three foundational constituents of semiosis or“semeiosy”, as he also called it (CP 5.473, 1907), as being the dynamic “cooperation” of three “subjects”, a sign, its object and its interpretant:

4.2 Barbara Kruger: “Your gaze hits the side of my face” (1981)

Barbara Kruger followed courses in artistic creation in several art institutions in New York, where she also studied under Diane Arbus. This enabled her to become acquainted with fashion photography, and she was also clearly influenced by the experimental photography of earlier artists such as Man Ray and Gordon Coster. In 1967, she began to work in the editorial division of Condé Nast as a graphic designer, a position which involved associating words and images in cover design, and one which enabled her to conduct a modest independent artistic activity, designing, amongst other things, the jackets of left-wing books. She held various teaching posts and since the late seventies has been an independent artist. It is highly probable that the economy of means and the pictorial efficiency which characterize her creations of this period are due in part to the professional experience that she acquired as graphic designer and picture editor with a number of magazines.

What is it that makes her art iconoclastic? She freely admits to having worked at the time of the image on Figure 7 with nothing but appropriations, images “borrowed” from an earlier time. These are collages, or photomontages, composed of pictorial elements which she deems to be eminently “quotable” and with which she most often associates an ironic or sarcastic verbal slogan, an artistic technique which enabled her, moreover, to engage in a form of cultural critique, but if the practice shows her to be strongly involved in the cultural debate of her time, it also infuses her montages with a consistent conceptual depth.

Figure 7. Babara Kruger: “Untitled” (Your Gaze Hits the Side of My Face), 1981. Gelatin silver print, 167,6 x 121,9 cm, 66 x 48 inches, Courtesy Sprüth Magers

Figure 7 is a typical Kruger image deliberately presented without a title, as a title would “close” interpretation. Such images from this period were typically framed in red (in the original) and had black, white or red bars of text placed over a photograph.This particular image is usually identified by the vertical slogan running down the left side of the photograph beside the forward-leaning bust of a woman: “Your gaze hits the side of my face” (1981), a deictically ambiguous statement in which, clearly, the term“gaze” has a powerful ideological charge. As was generally the case at this time, Kruger’s technique consists in taking a preexistent image, often from magazines from the Fifties,and cropping it. Then, by including a critical fragment of text as a form of collage,she “reframes” it, so to speak, in an entirely different contemporary and ideologicallypregnant context, with, as can be seen in this case from the bowing, subservient position of the female head, references to feminism, the abuse of power, the male gaze, gender stereotypes, consumerism and politics. By the use in her photomontages of first and second person pronouns and possessive adjectives such as “I”, “you”, “my” and “your”,Kruger deliberately disrupts normal deictic usage as no one really knows who is being addressed.

which determines the Explicit Interpretant,

4.3 The three universes of existence

In a manner that clearly parallels the presentation in the letter to Lady Welby of 1904 of his six divisions of signs within the framework of the phenomenology on which signaction was then based (CP 8.327-8.333), Peirce prefaced the definition of hexadic sign action given in section 3.4 above by a thorough description of the three universes by means of which he now established the subdivisions within each of the six trichotomies:

It is clearly indispensable to start with an accurate and broad analysis of the nature of a Sign. I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former... I recognize three Universes, which are distinguished by three Modalities of Being. One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone… I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability of actualization… Another Universe is that of,1st, Objects whose Being consists in their Brute reactions, and of, 2nd, the Facts… I call the Objects, Things, or more unambiguously, Existents, and the facts about them I call Facts…The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its Nature necessitant, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something expressible in a universal proposition. (EP2, pp. 478-479)

The purpose of the phenomenology in 1903 was to establish clearly the formal elements,making it possible to describe the sign as a phenomenon. This was Peirce’s goal in employing the three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, and although the sign was defined as being determined by its object to produce an interpretant, there was no dynamism inherent in the classes defined by the resultant three-division typology:no dynamism, no purposive agency. However, by 1908 with the definition of the sign as a medium and with Peirce’s realization that semiosis was a dynamic process, the three universes supplied the system with “receptacles” of entities—possible, existent and necessitant entities—that could function as signs and interpretants, but above all, as objects.

Most importantly for the present paper, these universes now provided Peirce with a range of possible dynamic objects that was virtually inexhaustible. In this way, his late illustration of various types of dynamic objects extends considerably our conception of what sorts of entities a given sign might stand for. In an earlier work from 1908,“The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (EP2, pp. 434-450), Peirce offers the following brief and tantalizing inventory of the sorts of entities that are members of the universe of necessitants:

The third Universe comprises everything whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes.Such is everything which is essentially a Sign,—not the mere body of the sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign’s Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living institution,—a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social “movement”. (CP 6.455)

As can be seen clearly on Table 4, since it is the dynamic object which is the logical origin of any semiosis and thus of the “form” communicated ultimately to the interpretants, it is logically possible for the sign as medium to be determined by both a dynamic and an immediate object more complex than itself: Peirce had already suggested that the dynamic object is not necessarily like the immediate in any way at all: “The immediate object of a sign may be of quite a different nature from the real dynamical object” (R339 277r, 1906). Table 4 shows how necessitant dynamic and immediate objects can determine an existent sign (this being generally the case in human interactions, since a necessitant, and therefore unperceivable, sign—a type—would require thought-reading and telepathic communication on an unimaginable scale), a series which would identify such signs as collective, copulant tokens. A cautionary note, however: Peirce never developed the 28-class system, and he never ever set out his typologies in the horizontal format displayed on Table 4.

1)γNa/γCl系数。γNa/γCl系数为地下水的成因系数，标准海水的γNa/γCl系数为0.85，低矿化度水的γNa/γCl系数大于0.85，高矿化度的γNa/γCl系数小于0.85[12]。由榆林市矿区离子系数统计表可知，γNa/γCl系数大于0.85的数量有31个，γNa/γCl系数小于0.85的数量有11个，说明榆林市矿区42个水样中绝大部分样品的TDS均较低。这主要是因为榆林市矿区潜水主要接受大气降水补给，排泄至周边河流的径流路径短，滞留时间短，水量交换循环积极，更替较快。

Table 4. The hexad of 23 December 1908 with the subjects set out across the page

That a sign can be determined to represent an immediate and a dynamic object more complex than itself can thus be seen clearly on Table 4. This was the case in the examples from Debord and Kruger: the signs themselves, the film (as represented by Figures 5 and 6) and the silver print on Figure 7 represent very perceptible immediate objects in the forms we recognize, but these have been communicated by their respective dynamic objects, which are none other than the two artists’ intention to invalidate by artistic means an ideology which they perceive to be pernicious and socially unacceptable. More generally, it is notable that the hexad determining the typology on Table 4 (see Figure 3) approximates in the logic of representation to our normal interpretive processes as we follow films by identifying the patterns of light and shade on the cinema screen as humans, animals, spaceships, extraterrestrials, etc., just as we recognize parents, friends and ourselves at earlier times on fading photographs, just as we recognize famous footballers, athletes, film stars and politicians on our TVs. These are manifestations of the forms communicated to these three different media—cinema screen, photographic print and the liquid-crystal displays on the TV screen—by their immediate objects, themselves determined precedently by dynamic objects which are of necessity different, if only by existing in a greater number of dimensions.

(4)高职泛在学习资源需要保证知识点的连贯性和交叉性。知识是相互关联的，不是孤立存在的。而现有的资源多是以课程为单位来建立资源库，课程与课程之间的联系并没有在资源库中体现出来。比如，《数据库系统》和《C#程序设计》这两门课就不是孤立地去学，学完的最终目的是需要用c#程序作为前台和数据库作为后台数据支撑实现一个完整的信息系统。当前的教学资源建设就没有考虑到这一点，而是作为两门独立的课程分别开发。类似的课程还有很多。为了避免所构建的教学资源成为一个个的“信息孤岛”，应该考虑到知识点的交叉性。同时，为了满足高职学生的碎片化学习方式，在开发资源时应该考虑以知识点来进行开发，而不是以课程为单位。

This leads to an important consideration for Peirce’s development of the dynamic object, its implication for the problem of intentionality in signification, and its analysis within Peircean semiotics. Since the dynamic object is logically the source or origin of semiosis, and since such necessitant entities as ‘a living consciousness…the life, the power of growth, of a plant…a living institution,—a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social “movement”’ are all potential objects of signs—Tables 3 and 4 above show in their different ways that both immediate and dynamic objects can be classified as necessitant—it follows that such entities can be sources of intentionality: support for a political party, an encouraging remark, a political pamphlet, a warning sign outside an electricity transformer, etc. The dynamic object, then, can be the source of intention, of deliberate creation, the peculiar nature and aspect of which—its form—is communicated to the sign by the structure of the form inherited from the dynamic object by the immediate; in other words, this is the form which the intentionality originating in the dynamic object presents in the sign.

5. Conclusion

It is the new theoretical approach to signs offered by a theory of semiosis with six distinct stages that enables us to develop the analysis of intentionality in signification in a way that was theoretically impossible in the triadic model of 1903. The sign is a medium in the normal artistic sense of the word, a vehicle, in other words, and this makes it possible to isolate the features of the immediate object that are communicated to it: what we perceive in a given sign is what the immediate object has communicated to it. The six-division typology on Table 4 doesn’t enable us to analyze those features phenomenologically as was the case in 1903, since the classes of signs involving icons, indices and symbols are absent from a typology subdivided by the three modalities characterizing the universes of existence. Nevertheless, we recognize in the signs created by Debord and Barbara Kruger the forms emanating from the ideologically inspired dynamic object via the immediate as the windows of a train approaching a station in the excerpts from Debord’s film, etc.; and as a female, human face, and as the words of an English slogan on Kruger’s image. This is simply what the two artists—as would all creators, surely—assumed we would recognize.The context of the two creative positions examined above, obviously, is this ideologicallyinspired desire to weaken the hegemony of visual perception and the power of the image in contemporary society together with the abuses they were held to spawn, an ideology of which Guy Debord and Barbara Kruger, and many others, are the vectors. But both were artists who deliberately and intentionally imposed on their signs their own artistic perceptions of the ideology that inhabited them in the form of very personal choices of artistic iconoclasm.

References

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